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Constitutionality of State and Local
Selective Purchasing Legislation: A
9-0 Supreme Court Decision in Favor
of and in Defeat of Plaintiff
BY REBECCA S. HARTLEY*
On June 19, 2000, the Supreme Court struck down
Massachusetts' selective purchasing law (the "Massachusetts Law")1,
which had restricted that state's agencies' purchases from companies
that do business with Burma.' All the Justices agreed that the
Massachusetts Law was unconstitutional on the straightforward and
narrow ground that it violated the Supremacy Clause of the U.S.
Constitution.3 Some had heralded this case as the one to decide the
question of the legitimacy of states' and localities' actions in areas
that have traditionally been considered governed by exclusive U.S.
federal foreign affairs powers. The National Foreign Trade Council
(the "NFTC"), which brought the suit against the Massachusetts Law,
specifically requested the Supreme Court to decide these broader
questions in order to give guidance to states and localities considering
sanctions acts, thereby also clarifying the issue for businesses.
However, the Justices declined to address the additional foreign
* Rebecca S. Hartley is an attorney in the International Department of Arent Fox
Kintner Plotkin & Kahn in Washington, D.C. A 1994 graduate of the University of
Virginia School of Law, she is currently writing her Ph.D. dissertation (Developing
Standards for Judging the Constitutionality of State and Local Jurisdictions' "Foreign
Policies") under the direction of Professor Kenneth Thompson at the University of
Virginia's Department of Government and Foreign Affairs.
1. Act of June 25, 1996, Ch. 10, § 1, 1996 Mass. Acts 210, codified at Mass Gen.
Laws, Ch. 7, §§ 22G-22M (1996). The various statues and court opinions concerning the
Massachusetts Law sometimes speak of "Burma" and sometimes speak of "Myanmar" as
the subject of the legislation. The "Union of Myanmar" was formerly known as the
Nation of Burma. This article uses the terms interchangeably.
2. See Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
3. Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Thomas joined, wrote a separate concurring
opinion. See id. at 388.
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affairs issues raised by the lower courts, and specifically restricted the
Court's holding to the Supremacy Clause violation. The narrow
scope of the decision leaves open the question of the legitimacy of
state and local "sanctions" regulations affecting countries not
currently subject to U.S. federal sanctions. Thus, at least in the near
term, the decision is a hollow victory for the NFTC and for those
orthodox theorists who advocate a broad interpretation of the foreign
affairs powers of the federal government.
Following Crosby, it is clear where the United States has enacted
unilateral or multilateral sanctions4 against countries or organizations,
state and local laws sanctioning those same entities are preempted by
the federal action(s). However, other important foreign affairs and
federalism questions remain open, including:
1. Are state and local sanctions laws concerning countries or
organizations where the United States has not enacted
unilateral or multilateral sanctions constitutional?
2. May states and localities take actions affecting foreign affairs
that are not, strictly speaking, sanctions legislation? For
example, may they direct government pension plans to divest
from companies that do business with or in certain countries?
Or, may they send foreign trade delegations abroad?
3. How should state and local actions be judged under the
Foreign Commerce Clause?
4. To what extent do state or local actions addressing foreign
affairs issues intrude on general notions of an exclusive federal
area of foreign affairs power?
Although Crosby does little to illuminate the specific answers to
these questions, it does shed some light on methods that may be used
to evaluate such state and local actions. This article uses the court
challenge to the Massachusetts Law to examine three of the main
types of constitutional challenges to state actions in the foreign affairs
arena:5 the Supremacy Clause, the federal government's "exclusive"
foreign affairs powers, and the Foreign Commerce Clause (with its
4. These include Angola, (UNITA) 31 C.F.R. Part 590 (2000); Cuba, 31 C.F.R. Part
515 (2000); Iran, 31 C.F.R. Part 560 (2000); Iraq, 31 C.F.R. Part 575 (2000); Libya, 31
C.F.R. Part 550 (2000); North Korea, 31 C.F.R. Part 500 (2000); Sudan, 31 C.F.R. Part 538
(2000); Taliban (Afghanistan), Exec. Order No. 13,129, 31 C.F.R. 538, 64 Fed. Reg. 36,759
(1999); and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), Exec. Order
No. 13,121,31 C.F.R. 586 (1999); and OFAC General Licenses Nos. 2&3.
5. An additional important constitutional challenge is a claim that state action
violates a specific clause of the Constitution other than the Supremacy Clause, such as the
Article I, § 10, cl. I prohibition against states entering into "Treaties, Mliances or
Confederations." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. This line of argument was not advanced
in the court challenges to the Massachusetts Law and is not discussed in this article.
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related market participant exception argument). It discusses the
strengths and weaknesses of what I label "orthodox" and
"revisionist" theoretical approaches to analyzing the constitutional
law of foreign affairs and evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of
each of the three main types of challenges in light of the Crosby
opinion. After briefly presenting the background of the
Massachusetts Law, this article examines the logic presented in the
Supreme Court, court of appeals, and district court opinions'
concerning federalism and foreign affairs from the perspective of
both orthodox and revisionist approaches.
An orthodox view of the federal government's foreign affairs
powers was manifested in the Federal District Court's approach to
the Massachusetts selective purchasing case, where the court
categorized the Massachusetts Law as an "unconstitutional
infringement of [the] federal government's power over foreign
affairs."7  The Baker Court declined to decide whether the
Massachusetts Law violated the Foreign Commerce Clause and
discussed the issue of preemption in only very cursory terms, claiming
that the NFTC's preemption argument was "not dispositive" because
there was not "sufficient actual conflict" between the Massachusetts
Law and the federal sanctions to support preemption! The
subsequent court of appeals opinion was much more expansive. On
appeal from the Baker decision, Natsios cited federal preemption as
well as the "foreign affairs power of the federal government" and the
"Foreign Commerce Clause" as supporting both the federal
government's constitutional superiority in all areas of foreign affairs,9
and the underlying assumption that in the absence of controlling
constitutional or enacted federal law, the federal courts are the
appropriate branch of the U.S. federal government to address state
actions that "interfere" with U.S. foreign relations. The Natsios court
concluded that because Congress' Burma sanctions were "in the field
of foreign relations, there is a strong presumption that it intended to
preempt the field."10  The Supreme Court's holding in Crosby
6. National Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287 (D. Mass. 1998),
affd, NFTC v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999) affd sub nom., Crosby v. NFTC, 530
U.S. 363 (2000). For ease of reference in this article, I refer to the District Court opinion
as the "Baker Opinion," the subsequent Court of Appeals opinion as the "Natsios
Opinion," and the Supreme Court opinion as the "Crosby Opinion."
7. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 293.
8. Id.
9. Natsios, 181 F.3d at 45.
10. Id. at 76.
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addressed only the preemption argument.11
In contrast to the Baker and Natsios approaches, revisionist
theorists, led by Jack Goldsmith,12 believe that in the absence of
enacted federal law or an explicit constitutional provision, the issues
raised by state "foreign affairs" actions that implicate the "foreign
affairs power of the federal government" should be resolved by the
federal executive or legislature, not the judiciary.13 Revisionists also
note that the Constitution "did not exclude all state authority that
might have an effect on foreign relations."14 The revisionist theory
thus "challenges the conventional wisdom concerning the allocation
of state and federal power in the absence of... a controlling federal
foreign relations enactment" and leaves open the question of under
what conditions state actions affecting U.S. foreign relations might be
permitted. 5 Even the limited scope of the Crosby opinion supports
the legitimacy of the Revisionists' approach, because it serves as
evidence that the mechanism Goldsmith and his colleagues advocate
for remedying state or local intrusions into federal foreign affairs
prerogatives can actually function. No expanded analysis of a general
federal foreign affairs power is needed under this view. Where
Congress identifies a foreign affairs issue it wishes to control on the
national level, its legislation preempts sub-federal bodies from
enacting conflicting legislation.
In contrast, theorists following a more traditional approach, such
as Brannon P. Denning and Jack H. McCall, Jr., support an expansive
grant of "foreign affairs powers" to the federal government as well as
the appropriateness of the judiciary's power to enforce that grant.6
Others, such as Peter J. Spiro, believe that the political branches of
11. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 374 n.8.
12. Associate Professor of Law, University of Chicago.
13. Jack L. Goldsmith, The New Formalism in United States Foreign Relations Law,
70 U. COLO. L. REv. 1395, 1399 (1999).
14. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The Abiding Relevance of Federalism to
U.S. Foreign Relations, 92 AM. J. INT'L. L. 675, 677 (1998).
15. Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L.
REV. 1617,1620 (1997).
16. See Brannon P. Denning & Jack H. McCall, Jr., The Constitutionaliti, of State and
Local "Sanctions" Against Foreign Countries: Affairs of State, States' Affairs, or a Sorry
State of Affairs?, 26 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 307, 336 (1999) Denning & McCall
concluded that "Goldsmith's argument against Zschernig, and against an exclusive power
of the federal government over foreign affairs, is forcefully presented, but unpersuasive[,]"
relying in part on the Constitution's foreign affairs-related provisions that create a
"structural or 'penumbral' restriction on state actions affecting foreign affairs, even in the
absence of a congressional enactment." Id. at 338.
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the federal government cannot adequately control disruptive state
foreign affairs actions, but argue on other grounds that the states have
a valid voice in foreign policy matters, and that federal exclusivity in
that realm should be abandoned.17  Although there is less
disagreement among theorists concerning the extent of the power the
Foreign Commerce Clause grants to the federal government, here,
too, there are interconnections between the questions of federal
preemption, general federal foreign affairs powers, and the Foreign
Commerce Clause that implicate practical questions concerning the
constitutionality of many state and local enactments.
I. Selective Purchasing Legislation
Selective purchasing legislation typically either bans companies
with certain characteristics from participating in a jurisdiction's
procurement process or places a premium on such participation.
Massachusetts is by no means the only sub-federal jurisdiction to have
passed selective purchasing legislation. At least eighteen jurisdictions
have enacted selective purchase statutes, restricting procurement
from companies doing business with Burma, Nigeria, China, Cuba,
and Indonesia, among others.8 Many of these countries are not
subject to federal unilateral or multilateral sanctions. In 1998, the
President's Export Council noted "the increasing use of secondary
boycotts by state and local governments to sanction those who trade
in or with certain foreign countries." 9
17. See Peter J. Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REv. 1223
(1999).
18. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 291; see also USA Engage State and Local Sanctions
Watch List (visited Feb. 23, 2001) <http://www.usaengage.org>, and is also on file with the
author.
19. Letter From C. Michael Armstrong, Chairman of the President's Export Council
to the Honorable William J. Clinton, President of the United States (June 2, 1998),
available at <http:lwww.tia.doc.gov/pec/sanction.htm>, and is also on file with the author.
(The President's Export Council (PEC) advises the President of government policies and
programs that affect U.S. trade performance; promotes export expansion; and provides a
forum for discussing and resolving trade-related problems among the business, industrial,
agricultural, labor, and government sectors. The Council was established by Executive
Order of the President in 1973, and includes twenty-eight private-sector members of the
Council (appointed by the President), five United States Senators and five members of the
House of Representatives (appointed to the Council by the President of the Senate and
the Speaker of the House, respectively), the Secretaries of Commerce, Agriculture,
Energy, Labor, State, and Treasury, the Chairman of the Export-Import Bank of the
United States, the U.S. Trade Representative, and the Administrator of the Small
Business Administration.).
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II. The Massachusetts Selective Purchasing Legislation
In the case of the Massachusetts Law, enacted in June 1996, the
Secretary of Administration and Finance was required to maintain a
"restricted purchase list" of companies that do business with Burma
The restricted purchase list contained the names of persons currently
doing business with Burma, and was to be updated at least every
three months.21 The Massachusetts Law prohibited, except in very
limited circumstances, "state agenc[ies], state authorit[ies], the house
of representatives or the state senate [from] procur[ing] goods or
services from any person on the restricted purchase list maintained by
the secretary.'
State agencies and authorities were permitted to do business with
companies on the restricted purchase list only in three limited
circumstances: (1) where procurement of the bid was essential and
there is no other bid or offer, (2) when the Commonwealth was
purchasing certain medical supplies, or (3) when there was no
"comparable low bid or offer."'  A low bid or offer was defined as an
offer equal to or less than ten percent above a low bid from a
company on the restricted purchase list.4 This amounted to a ten-
percent surcharge placed on the bids of all companies in the
Massachusetts state procurement process, which did business with
Burma.'
20. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 7, § 22J (1996).
21. See id. at § 22J.
22. Id. at § 22H.
23. Id.
24. See id. at § 22G.
25. Doing business with Burma is defined as:
(a) having a principal place of business, place of incorporation or its corporate
headquarters in Burma (Myanmar) or having any operations, leases, franchises,
majority-owned subsidiaries, distribution agreements, or any other similar
agreements in Burma (Myanmar), or being the majority-owned subsidiary,
licensee or franchise of such a person;
(b) providing financial services to the government of Burma (Myanmar),
including providing direct loans, underwriting government securities, providing
any consulting advice or assistance, providing brokerage services, acting as a
trustee or escrow agent, or otherwise acting as an agent pursuant to a contractual
agreement;
(c) promoting the importation or sale of gems, timber, oil, gas or other related
products, commerce in which is largely controlled by the government of Burma
(Myanmar), from Burma (Myanmar); or
(d) providing any goods or services to the government of Burma (Myanmar).
[Vol. 28:67
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Massachusetts Representative Byron Rushing, the statute's
author, justified the measure, saying that rather than conducting
foreign policy per se, the state was simply deciding "on moral grounds
who we buy from, just like an individual can. '" But the
Massachusetts Law's legislative history makes it clear that at least
some of the statute's supporters considered it to be a Massachusetts
"foreign policy" measure with the goal of influencing Burma's
domestic politics.27 Furthermore, in the Baker case, attorneys for the
Commonwealth admitted that the Massachusetts Law was passed "to
sanction Myanmar for human rights violations and to change
Myamar's domestic policies."' On appeal, the Natsios Court noted
that Massachusetts conceded that the Massachusetts Law "expresses
the Commonwealth's own disapproval of the violations of human
rights committed by the Burmese government" and reflects "the
historic concerns of the citizens of Massachusetts" with human
rights.29
A. Domestic and Foreign Opposition to the Massachusetts Law
In April 1998, the National Foreign Trade Council filed suit in
federal district court to challenge the Massachusetts Law. The NFTC
is a Washington, D.C.-based trade association for more than 550
American companies with foreign interests, including U.S.
subsidiaries of foreign companies.' According to the NFTC, more
than 30 of its member companies were listed on the Massachusetts
restricted list because they had business ties with Burma." Domestic
opposition also included the Chamber of Commerce of the United
States of America and the Organization for International Investment,
which filed a joint amicus curiae brief in Baker in support of the
26. Michael S. Lelyveld, Clinton Faces Constitutional Battle Over Myanmar Sanctions,
JOURNAL OF COMMERCE, March 6,1998.
27. See, e.g., Mass. House Debate on H2833, July 19,1995, transcript at 4-5.
28. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 291.
29. Natsios, 181 F.3d at 46-47.
30. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for
Preliminary Injunction or, Alternatively, for Consolidation and Expedited Consideration
of the Merits, at 16, NFTC v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287 (D. Mass. 1998). This
Memorandum is available at: <http://usaengage.orglbackground/lawsuitlmemo.html>, and
is also on file with the author [hereinafter Memorandum of Points and Authorities].
31. Id. at 2.
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NFTC.32 These and similar parties also filed amicus curiae briefs in
Crosby.
33
In July 1997, the European Union (the "EU") issued its annual report
on U.S. trade barriers. This report criticized the U.S. habit of passing
domestic legislation that has significant extraterritorial effects, citing
the Massachusetts Law as one example of such a law.' On July 30,
1997, the EU initiated World Trade Organization ("WTO") action,
claiming the Massachusetts Law violated the WTO Government
Procurement Act.35 In addition to its specific claim of a WTO
violation, the EU expressed its concern that a "potential proliferation
of state and local efforts to conduct foreign policy would greatly
increase the difficulties that the EU has encountered in dealing with
the United States on policies toward third countries," and would
"contradict and undermine the joint efforts of the EU and the U.S.
Government" in negotiating mutually agreeable principles covering
the use of sanctions.36 The WTO suit, which was joined by Japan, was
later suspended pending the outcome of the NFrC's suit against the
Massachusetts Law.37
B. Federal Burma Sanctions
On May 20, 1997, President Clinton declared a national
emergency with respect to Burma, 8 certifying that the Government of
Burma had committed large-scale repression of the Democratic
opposition in Burma and enacting U.S. federal sanctions under the
authority of the International Emergency Economic Powers Ace9
("IEEPA") and the Foreign Operations, Export Financing and
32. This Brief in Support of the National Foreign Trade Council is available at:
<http://usaengage.orgbackground/lawsuit/burmabrief.html>, and is also on file with the
author.
33. A list of the parties filing amicus briefs on behalf of both parties to the Crosby
case is available at <http://usaengage.org>, and is also on file with the author.
34. See John R. Schmertz, Jr. & Mike Meier, EU Publishes 1997 Report on U.S. Trade
Barriers, INTERNATIONAL LAW UPDATE, Aug. 1997. The EU Report is available at:
<http:/europa.eu.intlenlcommldg0l/eu-us.html>, and is also on file with the author.
35. Amicus Curiae Brief In Support Of Plaintiff National Foreign Trade Council at 3,
Crosby v. NFTC, 120 S. Ct. 2288 (2000) (No. 99-474).
This brief is available at <http:llusaengage.orglresources/nftcbrief.html>, and is
also on file with the author.
36. Id. at 4.
37. See Crosby, 120 S. Ct. at 2299 n.19
38. See Exec. Order No. 13,047, 62 Fed. Reg. 28,301 (1997).
39. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (2000).
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Related Programs Appropriations Act of 1997 (the "Sanctions
Act").' The federal sanctions imposed on Burma as a result of the
President's certification (the "Federal Sanctions") include:
1. A prohibition on new investment in Burma by U.S. persons;
41
2. A prohibition against U.S. persons from "facilitating" a
foreign person's investment in Burma, if the foreign person's
activity would constitute a prohibited investment if it were
made by a U.S. person;42 and
3. A prohibition on investment in foreign companies where the
foreign company's profits are predominantly derived from the
company's economic development of Burmese resources.43
The Federal Sanctions do not include any prohibition against the
sale or purchase of goods or services to or from Burma if the
transaction in question does not result in an American person's
acquisition of an equity or income interest in a Burmese project.' 4
The Federal Sanctions also exempt investment in Burma for non-
profit, educational, health, or other humanitarian purposes.45 The
Federal Sanctions apply only to U.S. persons; foreign companies'
actions are not specifically covered. Neither the Sanctions Act nor
President Clinton's Executive Order refers to state or local sanctions
against Burma.
C. The Legal Challenge to the Massachusetts Law
The Massachusetts Law was successfully challenged in federal
court on the district court, court of appeals and Supreme Court levels.
The district court decision relied solely on the exclusive foreign affairs
powers of the federal government and discussed the NFTC's other
claims only briefly. The court of appeals upheld the district court's
reasoning, but also considered the Foreign Commerce Clause and
preemption claims raised by the NFTC. The Supreme Court rested
its decision on the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, ruling that
the Massachusetts Law was preempted by the Federal Sanctions. This
40. Although this legislation covered far more than Congress' sanctions legislation
concerning Burma, for the purposes of this article, the relevant portions of this legislation
are referred to as the "Sanctions Act." See Foreign Operations, Export Financing and
Related Programs Act, Pub. L. 104-208, § 570 (1997).
41. 31 C.F.R. Part 537.201 (1999).
42. 31 C.F.R. Part 537.202 (1999).
43. 31 C.F.R. Part 537.405 (1999).
44. 31 C.F.R. Part 537.204 (1999).
45. 31 C.F.R. Part 537.403 (1999).
Fall 20001 SELECTIVE PURCHASING LEGISLATION
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
section examines the grounds on which the Massachusetts Law was
declared unconstitutional and critiques the court opinions from the
revisionist and orthodox points of view.
1. NFTC v. Baker (Federal District Court)
a. Exclusive Foreign Affairs Power and the "Effects Test"
In judging the constitutionality of the Massachusetts Law, the
Baker Court relied on the premise that "the federal government has
exclusive authority to conduct foreign affairs. 46 The court found
support for this proposition in the "numerous constitutional
provisions [that] evidence the Framers' intent to vest plenary power
over foreign affairs in the federal government."'47  The court
concluded that the "proper forum to raise ... [concerns for the
welfare of the people of Myanmar] is the United States Congress."'
The Baker Court employed a classic orthodox approach in using an
"effects test" to judge whether the Massachusetts Law was
constitutional. Citing Zschernig v. Miller,9 as the Supreme Court's
declaration that state laws are invalid when they have more than
"some incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries,"5 the Baker
Court said that "states and municipalities must yield to the federal
government when their actions affect significant issues of foreign
policy."51 The Baker Court relied on the Zschernig effects test to
judge the "substantive impact a state statute has on foreign
relations."'52 However, in addition to finding that the Massachusetts
Law had a "disruptive impact on foreign relations,"'53 the court also
stated that the simple fact that the Massachusetts Law was "designed
with the purpose of changing Burma's domestic policy" rendered the
act "an unconstitutional infringement on the foreign affairs powers of
46. NFTc v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287,290 (D. Mass. 1998).
47. Id. (emphasis added.) The court cited Article I, § 8, cl. 1 & 3; Article II, ci. 2;
Article I, § 10, cls. 1-3. Black's Law Dictionary defines "plenary" as "Full, entire,
complete, absolute, perfect, unqualified." BLACK'S LAv DICrIONARY 1154 (6th ed.
1990).
48. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 293.
49. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
50. Id. at 434-435.
51. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d. at 291.
52. Id. at 292.
53. Id. at 291.
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the federal government.""' Thus, it would appear that under Baker
the mere intent to perform some arguably foreign affairs purpose can
render a state act unconstitutional. No documented "impact" on U.S.
foreign relations is required.
It may be argued that this standard appears to move beyond
Justice Douglas' Zschernig opinion, which said that the traditional
state actions in the area of descent and distribution of estates "must
give way if they impair the effective exercise of the Nation's foreign
policy."55 Although Justice Douglas noted for the Zschernig majority
that the effects of state action could be "persistent and subtle,"56 it
seems likely that he would have permitted state actions that do not
have more than "some incidental or indirect effect in foreign
countries."57 His Zschernig decision reflects his conclusion that the
Oregon statute created a "great potential for disruption or
embarrassment."58 Orthodox theorists such as Denning and McCall
support a narrower interpretation of Zschernig, citing Justice
Stewart's concurrence in Zschernig as providing a "better standard"
of deciding the constitutionality of a state's action based on the "basic
allocation of power between the States and the Nation."59 Justice
Stewart believed the federal government had an area of "exclusive
competence" in foreign relations, which should be left "entirely free
from local interference."" This line of interpretation would lead to
the conclusion that federalism concerns, and not an "effects test" is
the best way to justify restricting state actions in the foreign affairs
area. However, it also begs the question of when state actions step
over the line of permitted behavior; perhaps the effects test will
nevertheless enter into the analysis.
Goldsmith's revisionist approach arguably takes a more
pragmatic view of state actions, asserting that "states, like
corporations, individuals, and federal government officials, can
[legitimately] pursue self-interest to the detriment of U.S. foreign
relations."61 However, Goldsmith and the revisionists also believe that
54. Id. at 292.
55. Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 441.
56. Id. at 440.
57. Id. at 434.
58. Id. at 435.
59. Denning & McCall, supra note 16, at 331 (citing Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 443
(Stewart, J., concurring)).
60. Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 443 (Stewart, J., concurring).
61. Goldsmith, supra note 15, at 1689.
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simply because a state action can affect U.S. foreign relations, such an
effect does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the federal
Judicial Branch should overturn such actions based on the ground
that they violate a general power of the federal government over
foreign affairs matters. Instead, Goldsmith believes that in the event
of a significant conflict, Congress or the Executive Branch should
preempt the state action, recognizing that "the federal political
branches always retain the power to [explicitly] preempt state law or
activity. '
62
b. The Foreign Commerce Clause
The NFTC's second line of argument to the Baker Court was
that the Massachusetts Law violated the Foreign Commerce Clause
by discriminating against foreign commerce and inhibiting the federal
government's ability to act in this area. Citing Japan Line, Ltd. v.
County of Los Angeles,6 the NFTC claimed the Massachusetts Law
impeded the "federal government's ability to 'speak with one voice'
with respect to commercial relations with another country.64 The
Baker Court declined to examine the NFTC Foreign Commerce
Clause argument on its merits, including any application of the
market participant exception, stating that because the Massachusetts
Law unconstitutionally infringed the federal government's foreign
affairs power, it was unnecessary to consider a Foreign Commerce
Clause analysis.6 Thus, the Baker Court took the most complicated
path to deciding that the Massachusetts Law was unconstitutional.
Arguably a Foreign Commerce Clause decision would have been a
narrower pronouncement of constitutionality because it rests on the
textual (Article I, clause 3) power to regulate commerce with foreign
nations, rather than requiring an analysis of original intent to
determine the extent of the federal government's general "foreign
affairs power." The Supremacy Clause argument that the Supreme
Court ultimately adopted was similarly based in the text of the
Constitution.
c. Preemption
62. Id.
63. 441 U.S. 434,449 (1979).
64. See Memorandum of Points and Authorities, supra note 30, at 16.
65. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 293.
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The Baker Court only briefly discussed the NFTC's argument
that the Massachusetts Law was preempted by federal sanctions
regulations, stating that the NFTC failed to prove "Congress intended
to exercise its authority to set aside a state law."66 The concept of
preemption is often divided into three subcategories: express
preemption, implied preemption, and conflict preemption.
Occasionally, Congress may use explicit preemption language in the
statute's text, creating a situation of "express preemption" by
explicitly nullifying or modifying existing sub-federal law.67 However,
in the absence of clear-cut preemption language, a court must
determine whether the statute provides evidence that Congress
clearly (albeit implicitly) intended to preempt state law or whether
the nature of the subject matter is such that the two statutes cannot
co-exist without conflicting.6 The Supreme Court's standards for
determining whether a state action is preempted by an act of
Congress include whether the law "stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress," 69 whether the federal legislation "occupies the field" of
commerce,70 or whether it renders compliance with both pieces of
legislation "physically impossible."' In circumstances where the
subject matter of the legislation is traditionally left to federal
regulation, preemption is more likely to be found.' Conversely, if the
subject matter is one traditionally considered under local or state
authority, preemption is less likely to be found. But as the Supreme
Court explained in Hines, there is no "rigid formula or rule, which can
be used as a universal pattern to determine the meaning and purpose
of every act of Congress."'74 In the end, the Baker Court simply
concluded that the NFTC had failed to carry its burden of proving the
Sanctions Act preempted the Massachusetts Act through implied
preemption'
66. Id. (citing Phillip Morris, Ina v. Harshbarger, 122 F.3d 58,68 (1st Cir. 1997).
67. See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519,525 (1977).
68. See Philip Morris, Inc. v. Harshbarger, 122 F.3d 58, 68 (1st Cir. 1997).
69. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52,67 (1941).
70. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218,230 (1947).
71. See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132,143 (1963).
72. See Hines, 312 U.S. at 66.
73. See Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Labs, 471 U.S. 707, 715 (1985)
(noting in the preemption context that the regulation of health and safety matters is
primarily, and historically, a matter of local concern).
74. Hines, 312 U.S. at 67.
75. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 293.
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2. NFTC v. Natsios (Federal Court of Appeals)
On appeal of the Baker decision, the First Circuit Court of
Appeals took an expanded look at all three prongs of the NFTC
claim, discussing in-depth the federal government's foreign affairs
power, the Foreign Commerce Clause, and federal preemption under
the Supremacy Clause. The Natsios decision specifically upheld all
three NFTC claims and affirmed the Baker Court's injunction against
enforcement of the Massachusetts Law76 after reviewing the Baker
Court's decision de novo.'
a. Exclusive Foreign Affairs Power and the "Effects Test"
In deciding whether the Massachusetts Law was an
impermissible intrusion into the federal foreign affairs power, the
Natsios Court considered the "central question [to be] whether the
state law runs afoul of the federal foreign affairs power as interpreted
by the Supreme Court in Zschernig."'78 The court explicitly
recognized a "threshold level of involvement in and impact on foreign
affairs, which the states may not exceed."' 9 The Massachusetts Law
crossed that threshold because:
(1) the design and intent of the law is to affect the affairs of a
foreign country; (2) Massachusetts, with its $2 billion in total
annual purchasing power by scores of state authorities and
agencies, is in a position to effectuate that design and intent and
has had an effect; (3) the effects of the law may well be
magnified should Massachusetts prove to be a bellwether for
other states (and other governments); (4) the law has resulted
in serious protests from other countries, ASEAN, and the
European Union; and (5) Massachusetts has chosen a course
divergent in at least five ways from the federal law, thus raising
the prospect of embarrassment for the country.' °
76. Natsios, 181 F.3d at 45.
77. Id. at 49. The court determined that there were no contested issues of fact, but
only issues of law. See id. Thus, it "[tried] the matter anew,... as if the case had not been
heard before, and as if no decision had been previously rendered." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 435 (6th ed. 1990) (definition of de novo).
78. Natsios, 181 F.3d at 50-51.
79. Id. at 52.
80. Id. at 53. The court declined to consider whether the Constitution would permit
Massachusetts to pass a simple "resolution condemning Burma's human rights record but
taking no other action with regard to Burma." Id. at 61 n.18.
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The Natsios Court expressly considered the effect of similar laws
proliferating in other state and local jurisdictions,81 and conducted its
"own inquiry" into whether the Massachusetts Law violated the
general foreign affairs power.' In doing so, the court examined for
itself the effects of the Massachusetts law on U.S. foreign affairs, and
performed precisely the type of function for which revisionists
consider the judicial branch least suited (of the three federal branches
of government).'
The Natsios Court's foreign affairs powers analysis mirrored the
Baker Court's approach to the issue. Sweeping in scope, it
emphasized the effects test as the most important consideration in
determining the constitutionality of state and local sanctions laws.'
The "dormant"' foreign affairs power analysis is, however,
intertwined with the court's preemption analysis for it cites the
"significant potential for embarrassment" as one of the factors it
considers in determining that the "Massachusetts Burma Law has
more than an 'incidental or indirect effect' and so is an impermissible
intrusion into the foreign affairs power of the national government. '
The Natsios Court implied that the preemption argument is not
necessary to conclude that the Massachusetts Law passed the
Zschernig effects test threshold, because the Law "target[ed] a
foreign country, monitor[ed] investment in that country, and
attempt[ed] to limit private interactions with that country, [thus
going] far beyond the limitations of permissible regulation under
Zschernig."'' This analysis distinguished the Massachusetts Law from
the various South Africa divestment statutes and cases (the court
deemed such divestment actions to merely target a foreign country,
rather than monitoring its actions and limiting private interactions
with it), and noted that the sole case upholding such statues
emphasized the extremely limited practical effect of the divestment
81. Id. at 53 (citing Zschernig, 398 U.S. at 433-434).
82. Id. at 54 n.9.
83. See Goldsmith, supra note 15, at 1623.
84. See Natsios, 181 F.3d at 52-53.
85. "Dormant" in the sense that it does not stem from any explicit provision in the
Constitution.
86. Natsios, 181 F.3d at 55.
87. Id. at 56. Massachusetts argued a market participation exception both to the
Foreign Commerce Clause and to the Foreign Affairs Power of the Federal Government.
The Natsios Court found "no support for Massachusetts's contention that the exception
should shield its law from challenges brought under the federal foreign affairs power as
interpreted in Zschernig." Id. at 59.
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law in question."' The Natsios decision also distinguished the
Massachusetts Law from "Buy American" statutes, which, although
the court acknowledged were not uniformly upheld by the courts,
tended not to "single out or evaluate any particular foreign state ...
[or] involve state evaluations of political conditions abroad."' In
comparison with both the South Africa Divestment statutes and the
Buy American statutes, the Natsios Court determined that the
Massachusetts Law was "aimed at a specific foreign state" (unlike the
Buy American statutes), and had more than incidental effects (unlike
the South Africa divestment statutes) °
b. The Foreign Commerce Clause
Although the Baker Court did not consider the NFTC's Foreign
Commerce Clause argument in depth, the Natsios Court thoroughly
discussed this claim, concluding that (1) even assuming that the
market participant exception could be applied in the context of a
Foreign Commerce Clause analysis, Massachusetts was not an exempt
market participant when it acted pursuant to the Massachusetts Law,
(2) as a legal matter, the market participant exception is probably not
applicable to defend actions that otherwise would violate the Foreign
Commerce Clause, and thus, (3) the Massachusetts Law violates the
Foreign Commerce Clause.9
The Foreign Commerce Clause is based in the constitutional
grant of power to Congress to "regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States." 9 If the state action in
question is "inimical to the national commerce," this power will often
be extended to cover even those situations where Congress has not
acted.' The NFTC argued that the Massachusetts Law violated the
88. See id. at 55.
89. Id., at 55-56. See Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Board of Commissioners, 276 Cal.
App. 2d 221 (2d Dist. 1969) (invalidating the California Buy American Act for
impermissible encroachment on the general federal foreign affairs powers); Trojan
Technologies, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d 903 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1212
(1991) (deciding where Congress has not yet spoken and a state's actions do not require it
to judge foreign nations' policies, a state's actions that touch on foreign affairs are not
unconstitutional, for nothing in the Foreign Commerce Clause insists the Federal
Government speak with any particular voice); K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp. v. North
Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm'n, 381 A.2d 774 (N.J. 1977).
90. Natsios, 181 F.3d at 56.
91. Id. at 62.
92. U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 3.
93. Natsios, 181 F.3d at 61-62 (citations omitted). Such an extension of power is
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"Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause." In response, Massachusetts
contended:
(1) Massachusetts was acting as a market participant rather than
as a market regulator, and thus was immune from claims that it
had violated the Foreign Commerce Clause,
(2) Even if it is not considered an immune "market
participant," the Massachusetts Law still did not violate the
Foreign Commerce Clause because:
(a) Congress implicitly permitted the Massachusetts Law
by choosing not to explicitly preempt it in the text of the
Sanctions Law; and
(b) the Massachusetts Law does not discriminate against
foreign commerce in favor of local interests, and
(c) Massachusetts has a legitimate local purpose in
reflecting its moral judgment not to associate itself or its
tax dollars with amoral dictators, and
(d) the extraterritorial effects of the Massachusetts Law are
not so "profound and inevitable" as to invalidate the law
on its face."'
The concept behind the market participant exception to the
Commerce Clause is that when a state enters a market as a
participant (for example, selling or purchasing goods) rather than as a
regulator (for example, setting the conditions under which certain
types of goods may be sold), its actions in the free market should not
be judged by Commerce Clause standards.95 The Natsios Court
rejected Massachusetts' "market participant" argument, both by
refusing to apply that exception (which has to date successfully been
argued in domestic Commerce Clause decisions only) to the Dormant
Foreign Commerce Clause, and by concluding that Massachusetts did
not even meet the conditions for applying the exception on a purely
domestic basis.' The court's opinion was that Massachusetts acted as
a market regulator rather than as a market participant by "attempting
commonly labeled the "dormant" foreign commerce clause.
94. Brief for Defendants-Appellants, at Section III, NFTC v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (1st
Cir. 1999)(No. 98-2304). [hereinafter Brief for Defendants-Appellants]. This Brief is
available at <http://www.usaengage.org>, and is also on file with the author.
95. See, e.g., White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, 460 U.S. 204, 208
(1983) (finding a City of Boston requirement - that at least 50 percent of private
employees working on construction projects funded by the city must be Boston residents
- does not violate the Commerce Clause because the government was acting as a market
participant rather than as a regulator); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 446-447 (1980)
(upholding South Dakota's decision to sell cement from a state-owned plant only to state
residents).
96. Natsios, 181 F.3d at 62.
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to impose on companies with which it does business conditions that
apply to activities not even remotely connected to such companies'
interactions with Massachusetts." ''
In addition, the Natsios Court felt it was unlikely that the market
participation exception could be applied in the context of a Foreign
Commerce Clause violation. Citing evidence that "'there is evidence
that the Founders intended the scope of the foreign commerce power
to be... greater' than that of the domestic commerce power," the
court concluded that to weaken that power might impair the federal
government's ability to "speak with one voice" in foreign affairs." In
the final analysis, although the court expressed its skepticism about
the market participant exception, it declined to speak definitively on
whether the exception applies in the foreign context.
Finally, the Natsios Court held that, absent an effective market
participant defense, Massachusetts violated the Foreign Commerce
Clause. As a result, the Commerce Clause jurisprudential standards
by which the Massachusetts Law was judged included:
(1) Whether the Massachusetts Law was "facially
discriminatory" against foreign commerce; and
(2) Whether the Massachusetts Law interferes with the federal
government's ability to 'speak with one voice'; and
(3) Whether Massachusetts was attempting to regulate conduct
beyond its borders; and
(4) Whether Massachusetts had legitimate local justification to
support its law. 9
The Massachusetts Law was deemed discriminatory on its face
because it discriminated against foreign commerce as opposed to
discrimination against foreign companies." ° Throughout the progress
of this case through the courts, Massachusetts never denied that a
primary purpose in passing the Massachusetts Law was to affect
Burma's domestic policy. The Natsios Court noted that local
favoritism is not a necessary prerequisite to a finding of
97. Id. at 63. The Natsios Court distinguished the case of the Massachusetts Law
from White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204 (1983),
saying that although the White case required companies to employ Boston residents in its
city contracts, the government did not require the companies to employ Boston residents
in other projects not related to the city. See id. The Natsios Court found the latter
situation to be more analogous to the "regulation" imposed by the Massachusetts Law. Ill
98. Natsios, 181 F.3d at 66. (citing Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 448, 450-51; South-Central
Timber v, Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82,96 (1984); Reeves, 447 U.S. at 437 n.9).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 68.
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discrimination, and cited Container Corp. of America v. Franchise
Tax Boardo' for the proposition that "state legislation that relates to
foreign policy questions violates the Foreign Commerce Clause 'if it
either implicates foreign policy issues which must be left to the
Federal Government or violates a clear federal directive.""' The
Massachusetts Law's foreign policy effects led the court to conclude
that it was discriminatory.
The "one voice" argument is clearly similar to the general
federal foreign affairs powers argument. However, it benefits from
more case-law support than simply the Zschernig decision, because a
strong line of cases including Japan Line, Container Corp., Reeves,
and South-Central Timber have established the "one voice" argument
in the context of a Foreign Commerce Clause challenge to state
legislation. In response, Massachusetts contended that there is no
requirement to necessarily speak with one voice, because Congress
has the power to "establish uniformity when the national interest so
requires.""
The Natsios Court concluded that Massachusetts intended to and
succeeded in regulating "conduct beyond its borders" when it passed
the Massachusetts Law." The court reasoned that Massachusetts'
stated intention to change corporate behavior and the fact that the
ten percent bidding penalty was an "effective exclusion from the
bidding process" meant that it not only intended to influence
Burmese and corporate behavior, but also succeeded in influencing
corporate behavior. 5
Finally, Massachusetts was unable to convince the court that it
had a legitimate local purpose in passing the Massachusetts Law. A
Commerce Clause challenge can be successfully overcome if the
jurisdiction in question can justify the legislation because it "advances
a legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by
reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives."' ' The Natsios Court
noted that Massachusetts had not shown any precedent to
demonstrate that moral outrage was a valid local purpose for
overcoming a Commerce Clause challenge, much less a Foreign
101. 463 U.S. 159 (1983).
102. Natsios, 181 F.3d at 67-68 (citing Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 194).
103. See Brief for Defendants-Appellants, supra note 94.
104. Natsios, 181 F.3d at 67, 69.
105. Id. at 69-70.
106. Id. at 70 (quoting New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269,274,278 (1988)).
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Commerce Clause challenge, nor did it assert that the Massachusetts
Law was the least discriminatory means of achieving that purposeY"
c. Preemption
The final ground for the Natsios decision invalidating the
Massachusetts Law is perhaps the most narrow of the available
constitutional arguments: preemption based on the Supremacy
Clause. Although the Baker Court decided that the NFTC had not
met its burden of proving implied preemption of the Massachusetts
Law by the Sanctions Act, the Natsios Court reversed that ruling,
stating that the lower court had applied an "erroneous legal standard
to the facts."'"
The disputed issue was whether, because the Massachusetts Law
predated the Sanctions Act, Congress' failure expressly to preempt
specifically the Massachusetts Law or generally all state and local
sanctions regulations meant that Congress did not wish to preempt
such measures. The court decided that the "real question" was not
whether Congress had declined to preempt the Massachusetts Law,
but to what extent existing federal Burma sanctions on their face
preempted the field, thus superseding any state actions in that subject
area.Y Citing a strong presumption that Congress intends to preempt
the field whenever it regulates a matter touching foreign relations, the
Natsios Court held that the "reasonably comprehensive statute
covering a field of foreign relations" preempted the Massachusetts
Law. 0 The fact that the expressed goals of the state and federal laws
were substantially similar could not overcome the fact that the means
to the goals were quite different. For the Natsios Court, the "crucial
inquiry is whether a state law impedes the federal effort. 1 . Because
of the court's factual finding that the Massachusetts Law upset
Congress' "balanced, tailored approach to [the] issue," it was deemed
unconstitutional because it was preempted under the Supremacy
Clause by the Sanctions Act.12
107. Id.
108. Id. at 71.
109. See id. at 73.
110. Id. at 76.
111. Id. at 77.
112. Id.
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3. Crosby v. NFTC (Supreme Court of the United States)
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in response to
Massachusetts' appeal of the First Circuit's Natsios decision. The
NFTC responded to Massachusetts' appeal by asserting that the First
Circuit Court of Appeals' decision was correctly decided on all three
constitutional grounds, presenting no conflict with any U.S. Supreme
Court, state supreme court or court of appeals decision."
Crosby found the Massachusetts Law to be unconstitutional
under the Supremacy Clause, citing the Massachusetts Law's "conflict
with Congress' specific delegation to the President of flexible
discretion, with limitation of sanctions to a limited scope of actions
and actors, and with direction to develop a comprehensive,
multilateral strategy under the federal Act.""1 4 Even though the
Sanctions Act did not specifically preempt sub-federal Burma
sanctions such as the Massachusetts Law, the Court decided that the
Massachusetts Law was "an obstacle to the accomplishment of
Congress's full objectives under the federal Act,"1 5 and thus was
preempted because it conflicted with a federal statute."6
The majority opinion first stated that it "granted certiorari to
resolve [the] important questions" of (1) the extent of the "foreign
affairs power of the National Government under Zschernig v. Miller,
389 U.S. 429 (1968)," (2) whether the Massachusetts Law "violated
the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause," and (3) whether the
Massachusetts Law "was preempted by the congressional Burma
Act."' 7 Ultimately, however, Crosby addressed only the last of these
issues, specifically "declin[ing] to speak to field preemption as a
separate issue ... or to pass on the First Circuit's rulings addressing
the foreign affairs power or the dormant Foreign Commerce
Clause.'1 . Thus, the opinion's holding leaves open several questions:
(1) Is Zschernig still "good law?" That is, is there a valid
"effects test," and, if so, where is the threshold for state action
that infringes on the general foreign affairs powers of the
federal government? How extensive are the general foreign
113. See Brief for Respondent at 12, Crosby v. NFFC, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) (No. 99-
474). This brief is available at <http://www.usaengage.org>.
114. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 387.
115. Id. at 376.
116. Id. at 372.
117. Id. at 371.
118. Id. at 374 n.8.
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affairs powers of the federal government?
(2) Is there a market participant exception to the Foreign
Commerce Clause? Equally important, if there is such a valid
exception, can "market participants" extend such an exception
outside of Foreign Commerce Clause considerations to counter
accusations that they have infringed on the general foreign
affairs powers of the federal government?
(3) When Congress acts in the foreign affairs context, should its
acts broadly preempt state or local actions in the same general
subject area? That is, in those cases where actual conflict with
the federal statute is not proven, should courts apply a lower
standard in finding implied preemption or occupation of the
field when foreign affairs matters are at issue than when purely
domestic issues are in question?
Although Crosby professed not to address such questions, its
conflict preemption analysis discussed many points that bear on these
issues. In supporting the argument that the Massachusetts Law
actually conflicted with the Sanctions Act, the Court advanced
propositions that are relevant to the nature of the federal
government's unenumerated foreign affairs powers. For example, the
Court cites the "President's intended authority [under the Sanctions
Act] to speak for the United States among the world's nations" in
crafting a multilateral Burma policy."9 Linking this authority to the
President's Article II, Section 2, clause 2 constitutional power to
make treaties and appoint Ambassadors and receive Ambassadors
and other public Ministers (Section 3), the Court labeled the
President's authority under the Sanctions Act as an exercise of an
"exclusively national power."'2° Permitting the Massachusetts Act to
stand would thus "compromise the very capacity of the President to
speak for the Nation with one voice in dealing with other
governments.'' Although the Court professed that this conclusion
did not mean it was addressing "any general considerations of limits
of state action affecting foreign affairs," it also cited its "similar
concerns in... cases on foreign commerce and foreign relations" such
as Japan Line and Chy Lung, as well as the concerns of Federalist
Alexander Hamilton that "[tihe peace of the WHOLE ought not to
be left to the disposal of a PART. The union will undoubtedly be
answerable to foreign powers for the conduct of its members.""
119. Id. at 380.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 382 n.16 (citing Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434
(1979), Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 279 (1875) and THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at
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Thus, although one should take at face value the Supreme Court's
pronouncement that the Crosby opinion does not address such
general issues as the effect of state actions on foreign affairs, one is
free to speculate that had Congress never considered or passed any
federal sanctions against Burma, the Supreme Court would have
given such considerations significant weight in a consideration of the
Massachusetts Law.
H1. Orthodox and Revisionist Theories and the Massachusetts
Law Case
The Baker, Natsios, and Crosby opinions illustrate the post-Cold
War tensions that plague constitutional foreign affairs jurisprudence.
One critical difference between the "orthodox" and "revisionist"
views arises in fundamental disagreements over basic terminology.
Whether there is a role for states in "foreign affairs" depends on how
one defines foreign affairs. If one defines "Foreign Relations" as the
relations between nation-states, one reaches a very different
conclusion concerning the scope of the federal foreign affairs power
than if one defines "Foreign Relations" to cover more than just the
relations between nation-states.
Of course, neither theoretical approach adopts such a clear-cut
definition of foreign relations or foreign affairs, but they clearly take
divergent poles on a continuum where formal diplomatic relations
between nation-states lies at one end, and a plethora of semi-public
and commercial foreign interactions lie at the other. In part,
disagreements over this issue are framed in "practical terms" by each
side, with revisionists stating that the interconnections are so
complicated that it is disingenuous to formulate a doctrine banning
states from any actions that have significant effects on U.S. foreign
relations, and orthodox theorists citing the critical role of the courts in
a time where such contacts are increasing the potential for
embarrassing the U.S. as a nation if sub-federal actors are not kept
under judicial control.
Thus, scholars' opinions concerning the effect of enhanced global
communication and other foreign connections can often predict
whether they are inclined to accept Goldsmith's view that
"interdependence [between domestic and foreign actors] has reached
such a level that a distinction between domestic and foreign relations
535-536 (Alexander Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961)).
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is no longer feasible as a criterion for allocating jurisdictional
authority"'12 between states and the federal government. This
revisionist approach contrasts sharply with the Natsios Court's
statement of an "alternative rational view," that "in an increasingly
interdependent and multilateral world, Zschernig's affirmation of the
foreign affairs power of the national government may be all the more
significant.""1
This fundamental disagreement sets the stage for a future
Supreme Court decision concerning whether Zschernig's effects test
and assertion of a general federal foreign affairs power remains "good
law" in the post-Cold War world. In its certiorari brief, the NFTC
asked the Supreme Court to speak to each of the three major
constitutional issues raised in the Natsios opinion to the extent the
Court felt any of the issues were unsettled.' The Supreme Court's
holding addressed only conflict preemption, though, and the issues of
the existence of or the extent of a general foreign affairs power or the
scope of the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause remain open. The
NFTC believed the "business community, the affected jurisdictions,
and the public at large-are served by avoiding delay in [the Court's]
consideration" of the Massachusetts Law because local sanctions are
proliferating and businesses need to make "long-term investment and
contractual decisions based on the assumed invalidity of these
laws." To the extent this contention was true at the time the NFTC
made it, it is still true with respect to all local sanctions acts
concerning countries that are not the subject of federal sanctions
regulations because the Crosby opinion does not address such laws.
Professor Louis Henkin states as fact that although, "[i]n
principle, all local contacts with foreign affairs might be brought
under national control by federal law or international
agreement,.. .Congress could not begin to do that in fact, and there
has never been any disposition to attempt it."127 His conclusion that
Congress cannot, for practical reasons, regulate all such contacts
seems quite reasonable, and raises the questions of whether, in the
absence of Congressional or Executive Branch actions, the federal
courts should step in to regulate such local contacts, and, if so, what
123. See Goldsmith, supra note 15, at 1671.
124. Natsios, 181 F.3d at 58 n.14.
125. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 113, at 12.
126. Id.
127. Louis Henkin, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 150
(2d ed. 1996).
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constitutional theories are available to courts wishing to regulate local
actions. The Supreme Court's ruling in Crosby does not decide either
of these issues. However, Crosby may be used by revisionists as
evidence that the executive and legislative branches of the federal
government do possess the institutional capacity to deal with
damaging state encroachments on the national foreign relations
interest, thus reducing a need for such judicial interventions.
IV. Conclusion
The dispute over the Massachusetts Law illustrates the strong
disagreements among foreign affairs scholars concerning an
appropriate, workable definition of "foreign relations" for the
purpose of determining whether U.S. foreign policy is unacceptably
affected by state and local authorities' selective purchasing legislation
and other "foreign relations" statutes. There may be greater
agreement among orthodox and revisionist theorists concerning the
legitimacy of a dormant Foreign Commerce Clause analysis than
there is concerning the continued validity of Zschernig's general
foreign affairs power doctrine. However, to the extent the "one voice
test" requires courts to analyze whether a state law offends foreign
nations, the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause approach shares
many characteristics with the weakest component of the Zschernig
analysis and is open to criticism.
The Supreme Court's use of a conflict preemption analysis under
the Supremacy Clause to invalidate the Massachusetts Law has only
narrowly affected this fundamental debate. Although some of the
language of its opinion implies a great degree of deference to the
federal government in matters related to foreign affairs, the Crosby
opinion's greatest effect on the orthodox/revisionist debate could be
its status as an example of a situation where the national government
effectively exercised its constitutional power to restrict state actions
affecting foreign affairs. Thus, in some sense the case may actually be
viewed as, at best, a quite limited victory for the NFTC because
further rulings will be required to determine whether state and local
sanctions are unconstitutional when Congress and the Executive have
not combined to enact federal sanctions against a particular country.
It can also be seen as at least an interim defeat from the perspective
of the orthodox approach, because it is an example revisionists can
use to support their contention that, in the absence of enacted federal
law or an explicit constitutional provision, the issues raised by state
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"foreign affairs" actions that implicate the important "foreign affairs
power of the federal government" should be and can be resolved by
the federal executive or legislature rather than by the judiciary.
